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WEEKLY REPORT

THE SITUATION IN THE CONGO

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Office of Current Intelligence

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Situation in the Congo

(Information as of 1700 EDT 4 May)

SUMMARY

The insurrection sputters on. Weary of harassment from Congolese rebels based in the Sudan, South African mercenaries sallied across the frontier from the Congo last week, and destroyed a rebel sanctuary. Khartoum has protested, and increased its border guard. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Having made peace with General Mobutu, Colonel Hoare is staying on. Tshombé and Kasavubu are increasingly at odds. Union Minière, confident of the Congo's future, is buying new locomotives to haul away the copper.

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1. Military Situation

The main event in the northeast last week was an incursion--or incursions--into the Sudan by Hoare's mercenaries stationed at the frontier town of Aba.

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The Sudan is taking measures to protect its borders.

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On 1 May Khartoum's ambassador in Leopoldville submitted a formal protest to the Congolese Government.

The Sudanese are aware that the mercenary raids were made by and largely provoked by Congolese rebels.

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the Sudanese foreign undersecretary in Khartoum told the US ambassador there that he believed the border incident took place during the course of a "hot pursuit" of the rebels by the mercenaries.

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3. Internal Affairs

The Congolese elections were officially ended on 30 April. Complete results are not yet available. Preliminary returns indicate that a clear majority of national deputies will support, in varying degrees, Tshombé and his national political vehicle, CONACO.

Political tensions between Tshombé and President Kasavubu have sharpened and partisans of each seemed to be prodding the two into a showdown. While the essential issue is who shall be president, the immediate battle is being fought over when and under what circumstances the "transitional" government of Tshombé shall end.

On 30 April, Kasavubu took to the radio to declare that the Tshombé government would remain in power until the final results of the elections are known, presumably sometime in June when the provincial assemblies select the national senators. At that time, Kasavubu said, he would convene an extraordinary session of parliament to approve a government of "National Unity."

Although Kasavubu seems to have changed his interpretation of the constitution to give the present "transitional" government another month and a half, his radio address drew a prompt, sharp blast from the Tshombé camp. Tshombé's right hand-man, Minister of Interior Munongo, declared that constitutionally Tshombé should remain in office until the presidential elections, six to eight months hence. Kasavubu thereupon ordered the Munongo radio speech tapes confiscated, and forbade the station to give any further information on the speech.

Suspensions, accusations, and recriminations meanwhile continue to grow on both sides, and it now seems clear that Tshombé will make a bid for the presidency. Tshombé has said that he could remain as premier with Kasavubu president

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There are further indications that Tshombé, once he feels his position secure, may try to dissolve the present 22 provinces--he has called them "provincettes"--and return to the six provinces of colonial days. On 28 April the Congo Army, probably with his approval, established a sixth "groupment" headquarters in the old Equateur provincial capital of Coquilhatville. Now all the old provincial capitals (Stanleyville, Leopoldville, Luluabourg, Bukavu, Elisabethville, as well as Coquilhatville) have group headquarters, and therefore are the loci of real power over the Congolese countryside.

Tshombé probably has at least two reasons for wanting to return to the old provincial setup. First, it is likely that he feels that the old system is administratively more efficient, with only six sets of corrupt politicians instead of 22. Second, he

probably believes it politically desirable as well. New provincial heads, who presumably would need his support to gain office, would probably be more loyal to him personally than the present provincial leaders, who independently scrambled to the top during the near anarchy of the Adoula regime.

4. External Political Developments

The plan being pushed by Ivory Coast and several other moderate French-speaking West African states to bring the Leopoldville government into their 14-member African and Malagasy Common Organization (OCAM)* is still moving forward. The sponsors developed sufficient momentum behind their scheme in the course of their recent round of consultations among other OCAM states to induce the organization's current head, President Moktar of Mauritania, to call a special chiefs of state meeting to deal with the question. Moktar has suggested the OCAM meeting be held on 18 May in Abidjan, the capital of Ivory Coast.

Congo's early admission to OCAM is still not assured, however. Although Moktar does not now seem as firmly set against the idea as he did in March when he refused to receive an envoy from Tshombé, he remains cool. The leaders of Cameroon and the Central African Republic have now indicated they have no objection in principle, but both are clearly in no hurry to bring Leopoldville to their organization. At the forthcoming meeting, some or all of these states may become tactically aligned with the Brazzaville regime, which is basically hostile to the whole Ivory Coast gambit. At a minimum, Brazzaville representatives can be expected to insist that no decision be taken on admitting Leopoldville until the elections are completed there and a new government installed.

Conversations with Ivory Coast's Houphouet-Boigny during the past week have provided further insight into his group's objectives. He emphasized the

* OCAM membership: Togo, Niger, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Mauritania, Cameroon, Rwanda, Malagasy Republic, Central African Republic, Dahomey, Chad, Senegal, Gabon, and Congo (Brazzaville).

political and psychological value, in terms of inhibiting radical intervention in support of the rebels, of simply bringing Congo into OCAM as soon as possible. He evidently is much less concerned about the details and timing of the proposed military and administrative aid to Congo. He indicated it would be entirely up to Tshombé to determine what help, if any, Leopoldville needed from the OCAM "family." Houphouet did not link the possible eventual supplying of OCAM troops to the removal of mercenaries, although he again stressed that any OCAM forces would have to be used in a garrison and not in a combat role.

The Congo issue again soon may be raised in the Organization of African Unity forum. Prime Minister Balewa of Nigeria has called for a special OAU foreign ministers' meeting to consider the problem posed by the refusal--because of antagonism toward Nkrumah--of most of the OCAM states to attend the OAU summit conference scheduled to be held in Accra this September. Houphouet claims he has reached agreement with Balewa, and also with representatives of Liberia and Sierra Leone, that a new effort in support of Leopoldville will be made at this special OAU meeting. Houphouet told the US Embassy in Abidjan that the resolution authorizing Leopoldville to seek African aid on a bilateral basis, which twice has failed by narrow margins, would again be revived. So far, there is no confirmation from Lagos or elsewhere that this will in fact be attempted. Moreover, OAU Secretary General Diallo Telli, who is against the effort under way to switch the Accra summit to another site, is dragging his feet on Balewa's request.

5. Belgium's Role

Belgian businessmen are showing increasing optimism over the outlook for continuing operations in the Congo. Union Miniere du Haut Katanga (UMHK) has been replacing heavy equipment, locomotives, cars and other vehicles as well as recruiting technicians. Its production for the first quarter of 1965 shows an increase over the first quarter of 1964. Moreover, the company announced on 15 April that net profit from operations in 1964 came to

\$11.3 million as compared to a profit of \$7.4 million in 1963. UMHK credits the strong market for copper, cobalt, and zinc for this satisfactory result.

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